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COORDINATING LOCAL ADAPTIVE
STRATEGIES THROUGH A NETWORK-BASED
APPROACH
XUEQING SHAN*
As the impacts of climate change become increasingly destructive
and pervasive, climate adaptation has received greater political and
academic attention. The traditional top-down model for mitigating
climate change, however, is ill-suited to implementing effective
adaptation strategies. Yet, local communities most impacted by climate
change seldom have the tools and resources to develop effective adaptive
strategies on their own. This note argues that a bottom-up, networkbased approach could be a promising paradigm towards implementing
effective adaptive strategies and empowering affected communities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Confronted with the impacts of climate change, a growing number
of communities are pursuing adaptation and resilience strategies.1
Bangladesh is a case in point. With a large and growing population,2 a
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1. “Adaptation” is used in different contexts and can mean a wide range of strategies. See,
e.g., Climate Change Adaptation Definitions, VICTORIAN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION RES., http://www.vcccar.org.au/climate-change-adaptation-definitions (last visited
Apr. 22, 2018) (listing definitions provided by governments and major international bodies). See
generally ROB SWART, ROBBERT BIESBROEK, SVEND BINNERUP, TIMOTHY R. CARTER,
CAROLINE COWAN, THOMAS HENRICHS, SOPHIE LOQUEN, HANNA MELA, MICHAEL
MORECROFT, MORITZ REESE & DANIELA REY, PARTNERSHIP FOR EUROPEAN
ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH (PEER), PEER REPORT 1: EUROPE ADAPTS TO CLIMATE
CHANGE: COMPARING NATIONAL STRATEGIES (2009) (listing a wide range of adaptation
strategies). This paper uses the term to refer to conventional strategies that aim to modify human
activities in response to environmental risks, and not strategies that attempt to modify the
environment itself, such as geoengineering.
2. See Saleemul Huq & James Totton, Basket Case No More? Bangladesh’s Successes
Portend Resilience in Face of Change, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS: NEW
SECURITY BEAT (Feb. 17, 2014), https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2014/02/basket-case-morebangladeshs-development-successes-portend-resilience-face-change/ (noting that “[a]fter
independence, Bangladesh’s population growth rate was one of the highest in the world”).
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heavy dependence on agriculture,3 and a geographic location
particularly prone to extreme weather events,4 Bangladesh is among
the countries most vulnerable to sea level rise and other climaterelated impacts.5 At the same time, it is also one of the most informed
countries about adapting to climate change.6 With its effective
emergency warning system, Bangladesh has been able to drastically
reduce casualties from natural disasters,7 and it has heavily invested in
long-term resilience building by reducing poverty, promoting
education for women, and ensuring food security through agricultural
innovations.8
National governments are not the only actors adapting to climate
change. In recent years, subnational communities adopting adaptive
strategies have proliferated. Cities are at the forefront of this trend. For
example, New Orleans, in anticipation of rising sea levels and more
intense storms due to climate change, has improved its water
management system, updated building codes, and established a
citywide evacuation system.9 Some neighborhoods have also begun
implementing creative solutions specifically tailored to addressing
local climate risks. For example, St. Kjeld, a neighborhood in
Copenhagen recently hit by a devastating cloudburst, replaced asphalt
3. See The World Factbook: Bangladesh, U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Apr. 24,
2018), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bg.html (noting that
“almost half of Bangladesh is are employed in the agriculture sector”).
4. See Gardiner Harris, Borrowed Time on Disappearing Land: Facing Rising Seas,
Bangladesh Confronts the Consequences of Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/29/world/asia/facing-rising-seas-bangladesh-confronts-theconsequences-of-climate-change.html (“Even without climate change, Bangladesh is among the
most vulnerable places in the world to bad weather: The V-shaped Bay of Bengal funnels cyclones
straight into the country’s fan-shaped coastline.”).
5. See id.; see also Arastoo Khan, Bangladesh – The Most Climate Vulnerable Country, THE
WORLD
BANK:
ENDING
POVERTY
IN
SOUTH
ASIA
(Nov.
21,
2013),
http://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/bangladesh-most-climate-vulnerable-country
(noting that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the World Bank, and
Maplecroft have noticed the particular vulnerability of Bangladesh to climate change).
6. See Huq & Totton, supra note 2 (“Bangladesh remains one of the most informed
countries on how to adapt to changing environmental conditions.”).
7. See id. (“Cyclone Bhola in 1970 had an official death toll between 300,000 and
500,000; . . . Cyclone Aila in 2009, less than 200.”).
8. See generally Bangladesh: Growing the Economy Through Advances in Agriculture, THE
WORLD BANK (Oct. 9, 2016), http://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2016/10/07/bangladeshgrowing-economy-through-advances-in-agriculture (“Bangladesh’s agricultural sector has
benefited from a sound and consistent policy framework backed up by substantial public
investments in technology, rural infrastructure and human capital.”).
9. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, LA., CLIMATE ACTION FOR A RESILIENT NEW ORLEANS 14
(July 2017), https://www.nola.gov/nola/media/Climate-Action/Climate-Action-for-a-ResilientNew-Orleans.pdf (outlining the City of New Orleans’s adaptation initiatives).
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with grass to collect and redirect water during floods and storms.10
Tribes and other indigenous communities have also adopted
community-wide adaptation plans.11
Indeed, unlike climate change mitigation, which calls for a
centralized coordinating regime based on a single institution applying
the same standard to all actors, adaptation can be better addressed by
a decentralized approach that relies on local efforts.12 Since climate
change impacts communities differently depending on their locations
and development statuses, adapting to climate change calls for “tailormade policy strategies that are fine-tuned within their context.”13 Local
actors are better suited for implementing adaptive strategies since they
are more attuned to the particular environmental and social conditions
of the community than national and international actors. Local actors
also have the greatest incentive to adapt since they benefit directly
from adaptation. In fact, local actors have spearheaded climate change
adaptation. The most innovative and progressive adaptation methods
are typically found among highly granular community units.14 Given
the momentum of local adaptation initiatives, some have touted that
climate strategies are entering a new bottom-up paradigm with cities
and local governments leading the way.15
10. See Elisabeth Braw, Copenhagen Unveils First Climate-Change Adapted Neighborhood,
AL
JAZEERA
AMERICA
(Jan.
26,
2015,
5:00AM
ET),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/1/26/copenhagen-worlds-first-climate-adjustedneighborhood.html (describing St. Kjeld’s transformation).
11. See generally Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Indigenous Adaptation in the Face of
Climate Change, 21 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 129, 146–65 (2015) (describing the climate
assessments and adaptation plans of four tribes in the U.S.).
12. As used in this paper, “mitigation” refers to conventional measures to reduce emissions
of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and does not include environmental modification methods such as
geoengineering. “Adaptation” broadly refers to “new strategies for avoiding and recovering
from . . . [the] harms [of climate change] and capturing and harnessing its benefits.” J.B. Ruhl,
Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL.
L. 363, 381 (2010). The discussion set forth is limited to modifications aimed at protecting human
activities from the impact of climate change and does not include modifications to the climate
itself (such as geoengineering). For different definitions of adaptation, see Climate Change
Adaptation Definitions, supra note 1, (listing definitions provided by governments and major
international bodies).
13. G. Robbert Biesbroek, Rob J. Swart & Wim G.M. van der Knaap, The MitigationAdaptation Dichotomy and the Role of Spatial Planning, 33 HABITAT INT’L 230, 232 (2009).
14. See generally Jerome Ross, How to Eat an Elephant: A Bottom-Up Approach to Climate
Policy,
BREAKTHROUGH
(Dec.
1,
2010)
http://thebreakthrough.org/archive/
how_to_eat_an_elephant_a_botto_1.
15. See, e.g., Steve Rayner, How to Eat an Elephant: A Bottom-Up Approach to Climate
Policy, 10 CLIMATE POL’Y 615, 617 (2010) (“Individual countries, and even regional and city
administrations, have the ability to revise and implement zoning, planning and building
regulations and invest in infrastructure in ways that drastically reduce vulnerability to climate
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The increasing public attention on local adaptation champions,
however, has not given much consideration to the coordination
aspect.16 Discussions about coordinating climate action have largely
focused on mitigation; only recently have some researchers and policy
makers begun exploring ways to coordinate local adaptive strategies.
Conceptually and practically, however, adaptation calls for different
analytical and policy tools than does mitigation. An inadequate
understanding of the need for and approaches to adaptation
coordination can make local efforts less efficient and potentially
undermine other environmental and policy priorities.17
This note contributes to the emerging public and academic
awareness of the need for adaptation coordination by providing an
overview of the difficulty of, the need for, and the potential ways of
coordinating localized adaptive strategies in the context of sea level
rise. The causal relationship between climate change and sea level rise
has been well established.18 Sea level rise affects communities at all
different levels of economic development,19 and there are many
examples of local adaptation.20 Part II provides an overview of the
distinct challenges facing adaptation and the inadequacy of a
mitigation-based framework for coordinating adaptive efforts. Part III
argues that adaptation coordination requires a network-based
approach and discusses possible features of such an approach. Part IV
concludes.

change in the short and medium term.”); see also Ross, supra note 14 (interpreting Rayner as
arguing that “adaptation should be tackled at its most effective level of governance”).
16. See, e.g., Carley Chavara, John Furlow on Better Coordination for Better Climate
Adaptation, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS: NEW SECURITY BEAT (Aug. 28,
2015), https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2015/08/john-furlow-coordination-climate-adaptation/
(quoting John Furlow, a climate change specialist at the U.S. Agency for International
Development, describing the climate discourse as having been “treating ‘adaptation’ like a sector”
and calling for more coordination with other social and environmental goals and among
governments).
17. See infra Part II.B (“The Inadequacy of a Mitigation-Based Coordination Framework”).
18. See, e.g., Is Sea Level Rising?, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN,
https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/sealevel.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2018) (“The two major
causes of global sea level rise are thermal expansion caused by warming of the ocean . . . and
increased melting of land-based ice . . . .”).
19. See, e.g., Sea Level Trends, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN,
https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/sltrends/sltrends.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2018) (showing local
sea levels rising in parts of Europe and North America that are mostly located in developed
countries).
20. See, e.g., supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
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II. THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH TO ADAPTATION
COORDINATION
The lack of a consistent approach to adaptation coordination is
not surprising, since adaptation itself did not gather much serious
attention in the climate change discourse until recently.21 Adaptation
has been one of the most controversial topics related to climate change.
On one hand, climate change skeptics question the gravity of the threat
and what actions should be taken to address it.22 On the other hand,
scientists and policymakers committed to combating climate change
are worried that investing in adaptation may divert attention and
resources away from mitigation.23 Only in the past few years has
adaptation received serious political and academic attention, especially
as headline-grabbing extreme weather events impact countries and
communities with increasing frequency. Local adaptive strategies have
proliferated, but coordination of these local initiatives is lacking.24
This neglect is problematic. Adaptation has distinct scientific and
policy challenges, and uncoordinated local efforts can have significant
geographical, temporal, and sectoral spillovers that exacerbate existing
inequalities among countries and communities.25 The debate over the
merits of and the need for coordinating sub-global climate actions has
been focused on mitigation. However, mitigation is a conceptually and
politically different issue from adaptation, and the same analysis in the
mitigation context is inadequate for adaptation.

21. See Biesbroek et al., supra note 13, at 230 (discussing that adaptation approaches were
seen as “defeatist” until recently).
22. See The Pillars of Climate Change Denial, NAT’L CTR. FOR SCI. EDUC.,
https://ncse.com/library-resource/pillars-climate-change-denial (last visited Sept. 23, 2018)
(noting the elements of climate change denial).
23. F. DENTON, T.J. WILBANKS, A.C. ABEYSINGHE, I. BURTON, Q. GAO, M.C. LEMOS, T.
MASUI, K.L. O’BRIEN & K. WARNER, CLIMATE-RESILIENT PATHWAYS: ADAPTATION,
MITIGATION, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY. PART A: GLOBAL AND SECTORAL ASPECTS.
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1117 (2014) [hereinafter IPCC FIFTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT].
24. Only in the past few years did newspapers, international organizations, and climate
scientists and policymakers begin considering the coordination problem. See generally supra note
23; Biesbroek et al., supra note 13; Julia Laukkonen, Paola Kim Blanco, Jennifer Lenhart, Marco
Keiner, Branko Cavric, & Cecilia Kinuthia-Njenga, Combining Climate Change Adaptation and
Mitigation Measures at the Local Level, 33 HABITAT INT’L 287 (2009).
25. See IPCC FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 23, at 1104 (“Added to other stresses
such as poverty, inequality, or diseases, the effects of climate change will make sustainable
development objectives such as food and livelihood security, poverty reduction, health, and access
to clean water more difficult to achieve for many locations, systems, and affected populations.”).
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A. Distinct Challenges to Adaptation
A major challenge to combatting climate change is scientific
uncertainty. Predictions of global temperature change are only
meaningfully accurate for a couple of decades,26 and they cannot fully
comprehend all possible secondary effects that a rising temperature has
on the environment and human society. However, mitigation strategies
are better able to accommodate uncertainty than adaptive strategies.
Mitigation goals are typically benchmarked by numerical values (e.g.,
the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting temperature increase to “well
below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels,”27 G8’s goal of
“cut[ting] emissions by 80 percent by 2050,”28 and concerns over
atmospheric carbon dioxide exceeding 400 parts per million).29
Accordingly, these numerical benchmarks are established through a
“positivistic research strategy,” which “[uses] information from a
limited number of scientific disciplines (mainly technology and
economics) and are embedded in sectoral policy domains.”30
Uncertainty can thus be quantified in climate models to better project
variables such as global temperature and carbon dioxide
concentration.31 Thus, despite uncertainty, researchers and
policymakers can still establish clear, meaningful, and generally
applicable greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction goals.

26. Zeke Hausfather, Analysis: How Well Have Climate Models Projected Global
Warming?, CARBON BRIEF (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-how-well-haveclimate-models-projected-global-warming.
27. The Paris Agreement, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement (last
visited Apr. 30, 2018).
28. G8 Agrees to Climate Targets Despite Differences with Developing Nations, GUARDIAN
(July 8, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/08/g8-climate-carbon-emissiontargets.
29. See Nicola Jones, How the World Passed a Carbon Threshold and Why It Matters, YALE
SCH.
OF
FORESTRY
&
ENVTL.
STUD.:
YALE
E360
(Jan.
26,
2017),
https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-the-world-passed-a-carbon-threshold-400ppm-and-why-itmatters (quoting Ralph Keeling saying that exceeding the 400 ppm threshold put humanity “in a
new era”).
30. Biesbroek et al., supra note 13, at 231.
31. See generally Andrew J. Majda & Boris Gershgorin, Quantifying Uncertainty in Climate
Change Science Through Empirical Information Theory, 107 APPLIED MATHEMATICS 14958
(2010) (using empirical information theory to quantify uncertainty in projecting coarse-grained
large scale climate indicators such as CO2 concentration and temperature); Jussi S. Ylhäisi,
Quantifying Sources of Climate Uncertainty to Inform Risk Analysis for Climate Change DecisionMaking, 20 INT’L J. JUST. & SUSTAINABILITY 811 (2015) (quantifying uncertainty in existing
climate models).
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By contrast, scientific uncertainty poses a greater challenge to
adaptation because adaptation is highly context-specific and
interdisciplinary. Adaptation involves a wide range of actors, sectors,
and jurisdictions, and it needs to balance different policy priorities. A
successful adaptive strategy—one that not only effectively protects the
community from climate risks but also receives sufficient popular,
political, and financial support—needs to measure the impact of both
climate change itself and the proposed strategy’s impact on other
policy goals. Compared to mitigation, adaptation depends on a more
robust scientific foundation and requires a higher degree of accuracy.
Since climate change involves “dynamic, feedback-plagued, nonlinear
physical and biological trends,”32 predicting long-term climate patterns
and projecting the effects of adaptation efforts are extremely difficult.
Unfortunately, adaptive strategies have not received the level of
support they deserve. Adaptation requires committing resources and
capital towards projects that must be periodically revisited in light of
scientific and technological advances, which is politically unpopular. A
comprehensive study conducted in Australia shows that scientific
uncertainty is a major barrier to implementing adaptive strategies to
mitigate the risk of sea level rise for public and private actors across all
sectors and decision-making levels.33 Uncertainty jeopardizes the
return on commitments to addressing sea level change and makes it
more difficult for decision makers to justify these commitments to
constituents and stakeholders.
Furthermore, no adaptive strategy can escape the possibility of
systemic risk, which can lead to cascading damages to other locations
and sectors. For example, as the earth’s permafrost thaws due to rising
temperature, bacteria and viruses buried underneath could release and
re-infect humans.34 No amount of existing information allows us to
predict the kind of pathogens that could be released. Since we simply
32. Ruhl, supra note 12, at 378.
33. See JON BARNETT, ELISSA WATERS, SAM PENDERGAST & AEDAN PULESTON, UNIV.
OF MELBOURNE & AUSTRALIA NAT’L CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION RES. FACILITY, THE
LEGAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND CULTURAL BARRIERS TO ADAPTATION TO SEA-LEVEL RISE IN
AUSTRALIA 30 (2013), https://www.nccarf.edu.au/sites/default/files/attached_files_publications/
Barnett_2013_Barriers_to_adaptation_to_sea_level_rise.pdf (noting that “[a] lack of relevant,
reliable, consistent and comprehensible climate projections is a key barrier [to implementing
adaptive strategies] for all respondent groups”). Respondents of the study come from private
individuals, industry and professional associations, community organizations, local governments,
the federal government, and academia. See id. at 7 fig.2 (identifying respondent affiliations).
34. Robinson Meyer, The Zombie Diseases of Climate Change: What Lurks in the Arctic’s
Thawing Permafrost?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/
archive/2017/11/the-zombie-diseases-of-climate-change/ 544274/.
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do not know what is out there, there is little we can do to address that
risk (except for mitigating climate change). The systemic risk in the
context of sea level change is not as insurmountable but is just as
difficult to assess. Glaciers are melting at a faster rate than expected,
and recent studies have found feedback loops that accelerate ice sheet
melting and destabilization.35 Scientists do not know enough about the
melting glaciers near the Antarctic because it is “too remote, too cold,
too expensive, and too complicated to have the kind of detailed
observing program that [scientists] really need.”36 Projecting sea level
rise is thus notoriously difficult; a recent projection “nearly doubles”
prior ones and cautions against the possibility of a catastrophic
scenario in the latter half of the century.37 This projection would dwarf
all existing expectations of sea level rise and would require
transformative strategies to protect communities.38
These features of adaptation lead to the distinct institutional
structure of adaptive programs. While the impact of global climate
change might be hard to assess due to the complexity of the climate
system, the particular risks facing each community are easier to
identify. The geographic and historical trends of a locale can assist local
actors to predict short-term trends. Local actors are also better
positioned to navigate the interconnected political, economic, and
cultural dynamics in the area to integrate adaptive strategies into the
existing social fabric in a cost-effective manner.39 Furthermore, since
the benefits of adaptation are reaped immediately and locally, there is
a stronger incentive for individual adaptive effort. Stakeholders with

35. See Brad Plumer, The Hardest Part of Dealing with Sea-Level Rise Will Be the
Uncertainty, VOX (updated Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/
2016/12/16/13971720/sea-level-rise-uncertainty-climate (noting that ice shelfs crumble in
Antarctica and Greenland and that “meltwater on the surface of ice sheets can open up crevasses
that break apart ice shelves entirely, causing further destabilization and faster ice flow into the
ocean”).
36. Id.
37. See Robert M. DeConto, Contribution of Antarctica to Past and Future Sea-Level Rise,
531 NATURE 591 (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.nature.com/articles/nature17145 (projecting that
“Antarctica has the potential to contribute more than a metre of sea-level rise by 2100 and more
than 15 metres by 2500 if emissions continue unabated”).
38. See Brady Dennis & Chris Mooney, Scientists Nearly Double Sea Level Rise Projections
for 2100, Because of Antarctica, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/energy-environment/wp/2016/03/30/antarctic-loss-could-double-expected-sea-level-rise-by2100-scientists-say (noting that Ben Strauss from Climate Central commented that “[s]hould the
new research prove correct, it could trigger a ‘tectonic shift’ in expectations for the speed and
severity of the sea level problem”).
39. See IPCC FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 23, at 1120 (noting that local
institutions are crucial to ensure policy effectiveness).
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different levels of capital, expertise, and objectives can be involved in
adaptation.40 Thus, while mitigation coordination has largely taken the
form of a top-down, centralized paradigm through instruments such as
international treaties that set a consistent set of goals and standards,
adaptation has largely taken the form of a bottom-up approach that
involves “tailor-made policy strategies that are fine-tuned within their
context of application in order to effectively reduce the impact of
climate change.”41
As local adaptation programs proliferate, however, there are
multiple dimensions of spillover risks due to the interdependence of
the various actors, sectors, and locales involved. One locale’s adaptive
strategy may increase nearby locales’ vulnerability to climate-related
risks (geographical spillover); adaptive projects built based on shortterm climate projections may make future adaptation difficult or more
costly (temporal spillover); and certain adaptive strategies might
undermine other policy priorities (policy spillover).42
Responses to sea level rise illustrate these risks. The two main
responses are building barriers and relocating to areas with better
adaptive capacity.43 Building barriers can entail all three kinds of
spillovers. Physical barriers can have geographical spillovers when they
result in unexpected secondary effects on nearby locales. For example,
upstream flood-control dikes can make downstream areas more
vulnerable to floods. Specifically, studies have shown that dike
construction in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta has increased
downstream flood risk.44 It may undermine other environmental policy
priorities when the barriers adversely impact the local ecosystem’s own

40. Professor Ruhl identified seven adaptation design parameters: actor (public-planned vs.
private-autonomous), orientation (proactive vs. reactive), goals (avoiding/repairing harm vs.
capturing benefits), management target (responding to changed variability of environmental
events vs. responding to absolute changes in environmental conditions), policy foundation
(substantive vs. procedural), capital employed (technological, financial, human, social, & natural),
and strategy (reduce vulnerability vs. enhance resilience). See Ruhl, supra note 12, at 381–85
(discussing the seven parameters in adaptation design).
41. Biesbroek et al., supra note 13, at 232.
42. See, e.g., Nguyen Van Khanh Triet, Nguyen Viet Dung, Hideto Fujii, Matti Kummu,
Bruno Merz & Heiko Apel, Has Dyke Development in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta Shifted
Flood Hazard Downstream?, 21 HYDROLOGY & EARTH SYS. SCI. 3991, 3991 (2017) (concluding
that “high-dyke development has raised the flood hazard downstream”).
43. See, e.g., Climate Change Adaptation Resource Center, Sea Level Rise, U.S. EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/arc-x/climate-impacts-water-utilities#tab-4 (describing “build[ing] flood
barriers to protect infrastructure” and “relocate[ing] facilities to higher elevations” as two
strategies to adapt to sea level change).
44. See Nguyen Van Khanh Triet et al., supra note 42.
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internal response to sea level rise.45 Physical barriers can also have
temporal spillovers; for example, if they have to be reassessed or
rebuilt in the future to reflect newer projections of sea level rise, future
adaptive costs will be higher.
Relocation entails a greater range of environmental, social, and
cultural values that might be compromised. Relocating entire
communities—for climate or other reasons—creates additional burden
for the hosting locale. A hosting locale may face the environmental and
socioeconomic burdens of an increasing population in the event that it
takes in residents from areas affected by rising sea levels. The
additional environmental stress may be manifested in water and food
shortage, loss of forestry and biodiversity, and pollution.46 Depending
on the social and cultural proximity of the relocated and hosting
locales, there may also be additional conflicts between the two
communities.
Furthermore, in many cases, the full range of spillovers and their
impact caused by an adaptive strategy cannot be fully assessed. Some
strategies bring co-benefits not explicitly comprehended at the
planning and implementation stage. In the case of the Vietnamese
Mekong Delta dikes, researchers found that although peak flood level
may have deepened due to the construction of dikes, high dikes have
helped redistribute floodwater and reduce the volume of water.47
Similarly, relocation has positive policy spillovers when it facilitates
knowledge and technology transfer between the hosting and relocated
communities.48 By contrast, even flow-through dams designed for flood
control (which are built to allow natural flow and to control floods
45. See Pam M. Berry, Sally Brown, Minpeng Chen, Areti Kontogianni, Olwen Rowlands,
Gillian Simpson & Michalis Skourtos, Cross-Sectorial Interactions of Adaptation and Mitigation
Measures, 128 CLIMATE CHANGE 381, 386 (2015) (“[C]oastal hard-engineering could prevent
coastal ecosystems migrating inland in response to sea-level rise.”).
46. See, e.g., John O. Oucho, Environmental Impact of Refugees and Internally Displaced
Persons in Sub-Saharan Africa 11 (African Migration Alliance Biennial Workshop on Climate
Change Environment and Migration, East London, South Africa, Nov. 15–16, 2007),
https://goo.gl/3hNG2E (listing negative and positive environmental impacts of refugees and
internally displaced persons).
47. See Dung Duc Tran, Gerardo van Halsema, Petra J.G.J. Hellegers, Long Phi Hoang,
Tho Quang Tran, Matti Kummu & Fulco Ludwig, Assessing Impacts of Dike Construction on the
Flood Dynamics of the Mekong Delta, 22 HYDROLOGY & EARTH SYS. SCI. 1875, 1890 (2018)
(noting that “continued high dike construction over the period from 2000 is likely to increase the
flood risk across the entire LXQ,” but “dike construction has produced radical changes in the
floodwater balance and distributions . . . [by] reduc[ing] the volumes of floodwater reaching the
LXQ”).
48. See, e.g., Oucho, supra note 46 (listing negative and positive environmental impacts of
refugees and internally displaced persons).
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when the water level rises)49 are touted for their downstream-localefriendliness but can have negative geographical spillovers, since they
may increase sedimentation in downstream water channels.50 In most
cases, the initial environmental impact assessment of an adaptive
project does not fully anticipate the multidimensional spillover effects
it may have, and follow-up assessments tend to be sporadic and
inconclusive.51
The scientific uncertainty of adaptive strategies complicates
policymaking. First, uncertainty jeopardizes a project’s environmental
effectiveness. An adaptive strategy that benefits one locale for 20 years
at the expense of other locales’ wellbeing or biodiversity is not
sustainable. Furthermore, the multiple dimensions of possible
spillovers often require local policymakers to balance different policy
priorities. Policymakers acting individually cannot be trusted to strike
the right balance, given the objective difficulty of balancing incentives,
the natural tendency for individual actors to seek personal gain at the
sacrifice of the collective good, and their susceptibility to giving in to
their constituents’ particular political ideologies.52 Lastly, the
uncertainty of adaptive projects may also make them less popular,
since the projects might require periodical reassessment in light of new
evidence and provide uncertain returns.
Worse yet, absent coordination, the multidimensional and
interconnected spillover effects can exacerbate the existing inequality
among communities. Developing countries tend to be hit the hardest
by climate change due to lack of financial resources, infrastructure, and
expertise in responding to those impacts.53 Compared to developed
49. See Flow-Through Dam for Flood Control, CLIMATE TECH. CTR. & NETWORK,
https://www.ctc-n.org/technologies/flow-through-dam-flood-control (last visited Apr. 29, 2018)
(explaining flow-through dams).
50. See TETSUMI SUMI, DESIGNING AND OPERATING FLOOD RETENTION DRY ‘DAMS’ IN
JAPAN AND USA 7, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/266293841 (last visited Sept. 23,
2018) (“Generally, dry dams have also advantage on environmental impacts to downstream river
since there may be almost no change in water quality and sediment transport in river with and
without dams, . . . [but] relatively coarse sediments such as sand and gravel may be discharged in
a low concentration a little delaying from the inflow one. This delay may cause sedimentation in
reservoir and sediment deposition in the downstream river channel.”).
51. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
CLIMATE ADAPTATION ASSESSMENT 6 (Dec. 2009) (observing that ongoing monitoring and
follow-up reassessment are absent from many adaption projects).
52. Studies have found that customers’ political ideologies even affect their purchase
behavior, see generally Dena M. Gromet, Howard Kunreuther & Richard P. Larrick, Political
Ideology Affects Energy-Efficiency Attitudes and Choices, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9314
(2013), which suggests that political ideology can also be a powerful factor for policymakers.
53. See, e.g., Laukkonen et al., supra note 24, at 288–89 (discussing that poor countries are
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countries, developing countries are already much less equipped to
implement local measures to adapt to climate change. The
multidimensional spillovers from uncoordinated adaptive efforts
exacerbate this existing inequality. Poorer countries may not be able to
defend themselves against the spillovers from upstream rich countries’
adaptive strategies, and they may not have the scientific and legal
capacity to prove the negative effects of upstream adaptive measures.54
Lacking access to financing and technology to respond to the now
compound climate impact—the impact of climate change itself and the
spillovers from upstream countries—developing countries would bear
the brunt of the consequences of uncoordinated adaptive actions.
B. The Inadequacy of a Mitigation-Based Coordination Framework
To address the distinct challenges of adaptation, local efforts
should be coordinated. Coordinating adaptive strategies can produce
myriad benefits across sectors. Coordination can promote climate
research by bringing scientists together and reducing unnecessary
duplication of research efforts. Knowledge sharing and information
transfer can help locales learn from each other and better adapt to
similar impacts from climate change. Inter-jurisdictional dialogues can
help policymakers better understand the impact of their actions and
align different locales’ incentives. Existing proposals for coordinating
climate actions are largely developed for the mitigation problem. But
a mitigation-based coordination analysis is inadequate for designing
adaptation coordination because mitigation is conceptually and
practically different from adaptation.
Mitigation is a collective action problem.55 Since the effects of
GHGs are evenly distributed in the atmosphere, individuals only bear
a small fraction of the climate impact of their activities. Thus, each
locale has every incentive to emit as much as necessary to achieve
development goals and no incentive to reduce emissions in a way that
sacrifices their other economic priorities. The history of GHG
emissions has been a classic case of the “tragedy of the commons.”
Since no single jurisdiction’s emission reduction effort can make a
meaningful difference in reducing the aggregate carbon dioxide in the

hit hardest by climate change due to their lack of resources).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Nicholas Stern, What is the Economics of Climate Change?, 7 WORLD ECON. 1,
4 (2006) (noting that climate change is “a problem of intertemporal international collective action
with major uncertainty and linked market failures”).
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atmosphere,56 regional efforts at mitigation will not work unless the
actors that do mitigate constitute a critical mass that meaningfully
reduces the global level of GHGs. Global coordination is thus
essential. Uncoordinated local efforts may even incentivize other
actors to emit more: knowing that others are cutting emissions, some
actors may feel less urgency about cutting their own emissions and
pursue short-term, more carbon-intensive projects instead—a 2.0
version of the tragedy of the commons scenario. The main policy
challenge in the mitigation context is therefore incentivizing
participation and addressing the free-rider problem.57
But adaptation faces the opposite incentive problem: each
jurisdiction has every incentive to adapt, since each individual locale
reaps all of the benefit of their own adaptation. Each locale has no
reason to care about the spillover effect of its actions on nearby locales.
Additionally, the locale cares about environmental priorities and
adopts a long-term perspective only insofar as its constituents do. In
the case of a subnational jurisdiction, spillovers to nearby locales, to
other policy priorities, and to future generations may be curbed by
domestic law.
Still, the spillover will not be easily remedied—or even
recognized—if it happens between countries. A burdened jurisdiction
may not be able to seek recourse due to, say, the difficulty of proving
causation or the lack of developed international rules and procedures
governing such disputes.
Mitigation and adaptation call for different kinds of coordination
due to their conceptual differences. The main concern over
uncoordinated mitigation is the leakage problem. Leakage refers to the
phenomenon that emission reductions in one locale lead to increased
emissions in other locales.58 Scholars and researchers have pointed to
two economic reasons why regional mitigation policies lead to carbon
leakage. First, one jurisdiction’s emission reduction policy may lead
carbon-intensive firms to relocate to jurisdictions with more lax

56. Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies,
155 U. PENN. L. REV. 1961, 1966 (2007) (“[N]o state could effectively control its own ambient
level of carbon dioxide or other GHGs, because that ambient level is determined by the
worldwide concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere.”).
57. See id. at 1965 (discussing how “[e]ach state (or country) has an incentive to free ride on
other states’ (or countries’) actions, enjoying the global benefits without bearing the local costs,”
resulting in underinvestment in abatement).
58. See id. at 1967 (stating that subglobal action “suffers from cross-border ‘leakage’ of
emissions: subglobal regulatory coverage encourages source activities to shift or ‘leak’ to
unregulated areas over time”).
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emission regulations, thus leaving the total global carbon emissions
unaffected.59 Secondly, reduction of demand for fossil fuels in one
jurisdiction may lead to a global decline of the price of fossil fuels,
thereby increasing the demand from other jurisdictions.60 In addition,
leakage can result from moral hazard: knowing that other locales are
adopting stringent mitigation policies, non-mitigating locales may feel
less urgency to mitigate.61
The leakage problem and the arguments against sub-global
mitigation efforts developed around it, however, do not apply in the
adaptation context. Adaptation is not a collective action problem.
Unlike mitigation, which conceptually lends itself to a global,
centralized coordination framework, localization is inherent to the
concept of adaptation. The assessment of and strategies to cope with
climate risks are context specific, as each locale’s climate vulnerability
is intimately related to its “geophysical, biological, and socio-economic
systems”62 or “the totality of relationships in a given social situation . .
. in combination with environmental forces.”63
Effective adaptation depends to a much lesser extent—if at all,
without financing—on the adaptation efforts of other locales. The
benefits of each locale’s adaptation effort are reaped entirely by that
locale; one locale would not “slack off” or delay adaptation efforts just
because others are adapting.
Furthermore, instead of driving capital away to non-adapting
jurisdictions, adaptation may instead attract capital by reducing the
physical and regulatory risks of the investing environment. In sum,
relatively independent from each other, regional actors have more
incentive to adopt progressive adaptation strategies that benefit

59. See, e.g., Brad Plumer, A Closer Look at How Rich Countries “Outsource” Their CO2
Emissions to Poorer Ones, VOX (Apr 18, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/2017/4/18/15331040/emissions-outsourcing-carbon-leakage (“If the US ever got
serious about adopting strict limits on CO2 emissions, one thing policymakers might worry about
is that many of America’s factories and plants would simply move overseas, blunting the plan’s
effectiveness.”).
60. See Joshua Elliott, Ian Foster, Sam Kortum, Gita Khun Jush, Todd Munson & David
Weisbach, Unilateral Carbon Taxes, Border Tax Adjustments, and Carbon Leakage 1 (Univ. of
Chicago Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 600, 2012) (“[I]f nations with carbon controls
use fewer fossil fuels, the price of fossil fuels may go down, resulting in more use in other
regions.”); see also Wiener, supra note 56, at 1967–68 (describing these two phenomena as
“carbon relocation” and “price effect”).
61. See Wiener, supra note 56, at 1967–68 (referring to the moral hazard problem as the
“slack off effect”).
62. Laukkonen et al., supra note 24, at 288 (citation omitted).
63. Id. (citation omitted).
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themselves. Thus, instead of leakage, the concern for adaptation is
spillover, as detailed in Section A.
Thus, the kind of coordination that adaptation calls for is very
different from the kinds of coordination that mitigation requires.
Adaptation involves a wider range of actors, multiple areas of policy,
and much greater scientific and political uncertainty, thus calling for a
different coordination tailored to these distinct challenges. While
mitigation demands inclusion and centralization, adaptation
coordination fares better under an integrated, network-based model.
The following section describes this model.
III. A NETWORK-BASED APPROACH TO COORDINATION
Compared to a centralized governance framework, which
concentrates decision-making authority in one institution, a networkbased framework distributes authority to various participants in the
network and focuses instead on promoting collaboration and
exchange.64 A positive side effect of this organizational flexibility is
temporal flexibility—by dispersing decision-making authority, a
network-based approach also allows various actors to respond to new
problems as they arise. Thus, while a centralized framework
“frontloads” decision making both institutionally, by delegating
authority to high-level actors, and temporally, by focusing on the initial
planning and assessment stage, a network-based approach distributes
decision making by empowering all actors and allowing for later-stage,
ad hoc responses.65
A network-based framework is thus better suited to solve complex
problems such as coordinating climate change adaptation,66 which
needs to respond both to intra-system connectivity (e.g., feedback
loops within the global climate system and their localized effects) and
to inter-system spillovers,67 often with inadequate information. Its
organizational and temporal flexibility can better integrate new

64. See, e.g., GABRIEL A. HUPPÉ & HEATHER CREECH , INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEV., DORIS KNOBLAUCH, THE FRONTIERS OF NETWORKED GOVERNANCE 1 (2012) (“By
making use of governance networks that may self-organize within bounds to help support certain
policy-making functions, networked governance integrates distributed capacities for problem
solving and policy-making.”).
65. Cf. id. at 7 (comparing “self-organized” governance networks with “acting steering”
governance networks).
66. See id. at 4 (“Problems of higher complexity require governance networks that are more
heterogeneous.”).
67. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text (discussing multidimensional spillover
effects).
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scientific evidence, multiple dimensions of policy priorities, and
different kinds of actors. Better still, the existing bottom-up model of
climate adaptation already provides the institutional foundation
needed for a network-based coordination framework.
The remainder of Part III discusses the existing structure of global
coordination of adaptive strategies and highlights some features and
institutions that might develop to facilitate a network-based
framework.
A. Current State of Adaptation Coordination
Currently, regional adaptive strategies lack a coherent organizing
policy. The fragmented landscape of adaptation makes adaptation
much less efficient than it would be with coordination. Jurisdictions
facing similar problems could have learned from each other and
avoided starting from scratch. For example, a major barrier to local
adaptation planning is access to scientific information. In many
instances, scientific data do exist, but the public and policymakers are
not equipped to interpret the information and translate it into
actionable strategies.68 Absent coordination, each community has to
reinvent the wheel and invests in technical consultancy to translate raw
scientific data to comprehensible policy recommendations, even
though the same challenge might have been addressed by other
similarly situated communities.
Furthermore, uncoordinated adaptive strategies undermine other
policy priorities, especially mitigation. Adaptation competes directly
with mitigation for limited levels of extant climate finance. In 2016,
over $112 billion was dedicated to mitigation financing and $23 billion
to adaptation financing,69 although adaptation is estimated to require
at least $70 billion every year.70 Certain adaptive strategies can
undermine mitigation goals. For example, adapting to sea level rise by
68. See Linda Shi, Eric Chu & Jessica Debats, Explaining Progress in Climate Adaptation
Planning Across 156 U.S. Municipalities, 81 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 191, 194 (2015) (noting that cities
in the U.S. rely on technical consultants to interpret climate data and have difficulty
communicating them to the public); BARNETT ET AL., supra note 33, at 30 (noting that many
respondents lacked “tools and techniques to translate information into informed decisions at the
local level”).
69. See The Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2017, CLIMATE POLICY INITIATIVE 12
fig.9 (2017) (reporting “[p]ublic climate finance by use”).
70. See UNEP Report: Cost of Adapting to Climate Change Couse Hit $500B Per Year by
2050, U.N. SUSTAINABLE DEV. GOALS (May 10, 2016), https://www.un.org/
sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/05/unep-report-cost-of-adapting-to-climate-change-couldhit-500b-per-year-by-2050 (“Previous estimates place the cost of adapting to climate change at
between $70 to $100 billion annually for the period 2010-2050.”).
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building dikes can disrupt the coastal ecosystem by eliminating
wetlands,71 which are excellent sources of carbon sequestration,72 and
vice versa: high-density urban planning can “provide . . . common
energy schemes that . . . reduce emissions,” but it also makes the area
more vulnerable to climate-related impact by increasing the risk of
urban flooding.73
A further consequence of the lack of coordination is the political
abuse of the adaptation label. Given the complexity and
interconnectivity of the global environmental, social, and political
ecosystem, the term “adaptation” can refer to anything conceivably
related to climate change. For example, a 2016 article argues that many
of Singapore’s climate adaptation policies were in fact little more than
conventional vital systems security policies such as food and water
security.74 Instead of recognizing the complex, interconnected, or
“pluripotent” nature of climate change, the island nation has largely
viewed the environment as just one variable in its engineering toolkit
to stage artificial, anthropogenic transformations to achieve other
policy goals.75 Its “climate initiative” was just a plan to achieve policy

71. See Up to Four-Fifths of Wetlands Worldwide Could Be at Risk for Sea Level Rise, UNIV.
CAMBRIDGE (Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/up-to-four-fifths-ofwetlands-worldwide-could-be-at-risk-from-sea-level-rise (reporting on research showing the
impact of sea level rise on wetlands and pointing out that “[a] main reason for the high
vulnerability of coastal wetlands to sea level rise is coastal ‘squeeze,’ a consequence of long-term
coastal protection strategies, such as dikes”); see also Louise W. Bedsworth & Ellen Hanak,
Adaptation to Climate Change: A Review of Challenges and Tradeoffs in Six Areas, 76 J. AM.
PLAN. ASS’N 477, 479 (2010) (“Sea-level rise will . . . accentuate the existing tradeoffs between
coastal development and coastal ecosystem conservation.”).
72. See generally, e.g., A. M. Nahlik & M. S. Fennessy, Carbon Storage in US Wetlands, 7
NATURE COMM. 13835: 1 (2016) (highlighting the role of wetlands in storing carbon).
73. Laukkonen et al., supra note 24, at 289.
74. See Jerome Whitington, Modernist Infrastructure and the Vital Systems Security of Water:
Singapore’s Pluripotent Climate Futures, 28 PUB. CULTURE 415, 417, 420 (2016) (noting that
Singapore’s adaptation policy is grounded in its vital systems security policies and pointing out
that Singapore’s adaptation focuses more on environmental engineering and planning rather than
assessing uncertainty and allowing flexibility); see also Eric Klinenberg, Climate Change:
Adaptation, Mitigation, and Critical Infrastructures, 28 PUB. CULTURE 187, 191 (2016)
(summarizing Whitington’s argument that “government officials [in Singapore] have framed
conventional population security policies as climate change adaptation strategies”). Vital systems
are interlinked systems that a society depends on to function property. See generally Stephen J.
Collier & Andrew Lakoff, Vital Systems Security: Reflexive Biopolitics and the Government of
Emergency, 32 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 19 (2015) (describing “the historical emergence of
vital systems security”).
75. See Whitington, supra note 74, at 420 (“[Singapore] is far too confident that it knows
what climate change holds in store, with the result of limiting its apprehension of the future to a
small number of constrained variables.”).
OF
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goals under a linear projection of global warming76 and would in fact
increase its carbon emissions by as much as 60 percent.77 Absent a
consistent understanding of what adaptation entails, multiple actors
would be operating under different climate paradigms using the same
“adaptation” label, which can exacerbate the existing fragmentation of
the climate landscape.
B. Features of a Network-Based Approach
A network-based approach has multiple advantages and can
effectively mitigate these existing and potential consequences of the
fragmented adaptation landscape. In recent years, subnational
initiatives in the U.S. have become more connected with each other,
and their success illustrates some of these advantages.
One of the major advantages of a network-based approach is
knowledge sharing. Communities facing similar climate challenges can
share knowledge and experience, thus reducing the cost of adaptation
design and promoting the development of better adaptive strategies.
Furthermore, communities can better identify synergies and tradeoffs
through collaboration, thus better integrating adaptation and
mitigation.78 Knowledge sharing can also reduce the inequality in
adaptive capacities by enabling vulnerable communities to strategically
allocate limited resources.
In the United States, for example, a major platform for adaptation
knowledge sharing is the Adaptation Clearinghouse operated by
Georgetown University.79 Launched in 2011, the Clearinghouse
contains over 2,000 adaptation resources80 to assist state and local
policymakers and academics to share information and build

76. See id. at 417 (citations omitted) (“Singapore’s planners assume that forecasted climate
changes will be limited to small, quantitative increases in set variables . . . [and] fail to consider
the likelihood of potentially nonlinear or chaotic impacts on vital systems security.”).
77. Id. at 431 (“The national policy advertises an 11–16 percent decrease in carbon intensity
by 2020, while real greenhouse gas emissions will increase by at least 60 percent, to sixty-five
metric tons, by 2020.”).
78. See IPCC FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 23, at 1117 (noting that “combined
adaptation and mitigation policy designs” should “avoid[] trade-offs, . . . identify[] synergies, . . .
enhanc[e] responsible capacity, . . . [and] develop[] institutional links between adaptation and
mitigation”).
79. ADAPTATION CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.adaptationclearinghouse.org/ (last visited
Apr. 29, 2018).
80. Adaptation Clearinghouse 2.0 Launches with Powerful New Tools for Adaptation
Professionals, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CTR. (July 14, 2016), https://www.georgetownclimate.org
/articles/adaptation-clearinghouse-2-0-launches-with-powerful-new-tools-for-adaptationprofessionals.html.
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partnerships.81 Resources include legal and policy developments in
different jurisdictions, updates of scientific development, and spatial
planning strategies. The resources can be sorted by state or by sector,
and the Clearinghouse tracks each states’ adaptation progress. Visitors
can also register and manage their adaptation networks through the
platform, an especially useful feature for adaptation officials.82 This
model can feasibly be implemented internationally, with academic
institutions, non-governmental organizations, and local communities
participating in knowledge sharing platforms and partnerships.
In addition, regional coordination in designing and implementing
adaptation infrastructure will be especially useful as jurisdictions in
close geographic proximity also face similar climate challenges.
Regional coordination can take place at different levels of governance
and among different kinds of actors. For example, in the U.S., a few
counties in southeast Florida entered the Southeast Florida Regional
Climate Compact to respond to the region’s particular vulnerabilities
to sea level rise by “reshap[ing] facilities for managing storm water,
wastewater, and drinking water in anticipation of hydrology reshaped
by higher sea levels.”83 Such subnational inter-jurisdictional
partnerships allow members to better leverage their federal and state
funding sources and coordinate adaptive policies in a manner that is
mindful of nearby jurisdictions’ needs and capacities.
To encourage local innovation and partnership, domestic legal
reform is necessary. Currently, in the U.S., the ability of state and local
governments to establish innovative programs and inter-jurisdictional
alliances is limited. For example, states hoping to build resilience in
food security by promoting domestic agriculture may be barred from
doing so by the Dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits states
from discriminating against out-of-state products.84 Some states even
voluntarily restrict their ability to adopt more progressive forms of
climate action. In North Carolina, for example, the state legislature
81. See generally About the Adaptation Clearinghouse, ADAPTATION CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://www.adaptationclearinghouse.org/about.html (last visited April 28, 2018).
82. ADAPTATION CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 79.
83. RICHARD H. MAYS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FORMS GUIDE § 29:10 (3d ed. 2018); see
also What Is the Compact?, SE. FLA. REG’L CLIMATE CHANGE COMPACT,
www.southeastfloridaclimatecompact.org/about-us/what-is-the-compact (last visited Apr. 29,
2018) (providing an overview of the Compact).
84. See Michael Barsa, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause?: Climate Change and
Food Security, 13 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 40, 56 (2018) (discussing how the uneven geographic
concentration of food production in the U.S. makes crops especially vulnerable to climate events
and noting that distributing food production in different states must overcome barriers imposed
by the Dormant Commerce Clause).
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passed a “federal ceiling” provision in its Administrative Procedure
Act that significantly limits the state’s ability to adopt more stringent
environmental standards than existing federal standards.85 Local
governments are similarly bound by laws that prohibit them from
pursuing creative adaptive strategies. In so-called “Dillon’s rule
states,” local governments may not pursue initiatives unless explicitly
sanctioned by the state legislature.86 A 2010 survey showed that at least
36 states in the U.S. are Dillon’s rule states.87 In other words, in most
states, local governments lack the legal infrastructure to adopt
innovative adaptation policies. Dillon’s rule centralizes decision
making power in the state and limits local governments to ex ante
policy tools on the books, but the complexity and uncertainty of
climate change mandate flexible and customized arrangement in the
delegation of political power. Thus, domestic legal reforms that
empower state and local governments are necessary to effectively
unleash the resources and partnerships of local adaptive strategies.
The most important aspect of a network-based approach is
ensuring all actors’ access to resources. Compared to a centralized
governance framework, a network-based one can incur significantly
higher transaction costs in assessing the scientific and social
implications of the compound impact of climate change,88 in
coordinating inter-jurisdictional negotiations, and in establishing new
institutions that facilitate learning and regional partnerships.89 The
85. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-19.3(a) (2018) (“An agency authorized to implement and
enforce State and federal environmental laws may not adopt a rule for the protection of the
environment or natural resources that imposes a more restrictive standard, limitation, or
requirement than those imposed by federal law or rule, if a federal law or rule pertaining to the
same subject matter has been adopted, unless adoption of the rule is required by one of the
subdivisions of this subsection.”).
86. Cities 101 – Delegation of Power, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES (Dec. 13, 2016),
https://www.nlc.org/resource/cities-101-delegation-of-power (describing that Dillon’s rule is a
“narrow interpretation of a local government’s authority” that allows “a substate government . . .
[to] engage in an activity only if it is specifically sanctioned by the state government”). The rule
originated from an opinion by Iowa Supreme Court Chief Justice John F. Dillon, in which he
declared: “Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly
from, the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist.”
City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868).
87. MATTHEW SELLERS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF JACQUELINE BYERS, NAT’L ASS’N OF
CTYS., COUNTY AUTHORITY: A STATE BY STATE REPORT 204–05 (Dec. 2010).
88. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text (noting the need to assess and respond to
not just the impact of climate change itself, but also the impact of adaptive strategies responding
to climate change).
89. See SUSAN KINNEAR, KYM PATISON, JULIE MANN, ELIZABETH MALONE & VICKI
ROSS, NAT’L CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION RESEARCH FACILITY, NETWORK GOVERNANCE
AND CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: COLLABORATIVE RESPONSES TO THE QUEENSLAND
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existing vulnerability and resource gap among jurisdictions is already
putting poor jurisdictions at a significant disadvantage in adapting to
climate change, and a network-based approach oblivious to this
inequality would undermine its effectiveness by excluding poorer
countries from sharing and contributing to the network. As private
capital plays a bigger role in adaptation financing, less developed
countries are at a greater disadvantage. Institutional investors are less
aware of investment opportunities for climate adaptation; even those
that are aware tend to perceive those investments as having less
developed financial systems and more volatile markets.90 Yet, these
countries potentially provide better investment opportunities given
their greater need for adaptation. A successful network-based
framework, therefore, must ensure information and financial
inclusivity.
IV. CONCLUSION
Cities and local communities are developing ambitious, innovative
strategies to adapt to climate change, but there has not been adequate
discussion over the necessity for and approaches to coordinating these
efforts. This neglect can significantly impair the effectiveness of climate
action due to the distinct challenges of climate adaptation. This paper
draws attention to the perils of uncoordinated adaptation and argues
that a network-based approach is better suited for adaptation
coordination. While the foregoing discussion focuses on adaptation in
particular, the network-based approach it proposes is not meant to
isolate adaptation from other policy priorities. Rather, adopting a fresh
paradigm to analyzing adaptation coordination can promote other
policy priorities91 and facilitate the development of an integrated
framework for climate action.

FLOODS 9 (2013) (citations omitted) (noting “a prerequisite for [the] formation and effective
function [of network governance frameworks] is that sufficient human, social and economic
resources are available to outweigh the transaction costs”).
90. See Geoffrey Heal, Funding Climate Adaptation, in THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND
BEYOND: INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY POST-2020, at 92 (Robert N. Stavis &
Robert C. Stowe eds., 2016) (noting challenges to private adaptation investments in less
developed countries).
91. See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text (discussing how a network-based
approach can identify synergies between policyd priorities and address existing inequalities).

